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I beseech you consider, how the name of the most holy and jealous God may be preserved 
between the clashings of these two... the glorious conversion of the Indians in New England and 
the unnecessary wars and cruel destructions of the Indians in New England. 
 
                                                 -Roger Williams to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, 1654 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Algonquian. A group of Native American tribes closely related through a common language and 
spread throughout New England and into Canada. 
 
Mohegan. A powerful Algonquian tribe with territory in western Connecticut in the seventeenth 
century. Notable sachems included Uncas, who closely allied himself with the English 
throughout King Philip’s War. 
 
Narragansett. A powerful Algonquian tribe whose territory included most of southern Rhode 
Island in the seventeenth century.  The Narragansetts consisted of a network of tribes, including 
the Niantics, led by the powerful sachem, Ninigret. Other notable sachems included 
Miantonomo, Canonicus, and Canonchet. 
 
Nipmuc. Eastern Algonquian tribe with territory in western Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  
The Nipmuc tribe allied themselves with Philip in King Philip’s War.  
 
Pequot. An Algonquian tribe of eastern Connecticut who were devastated by the English in the 
Pequot War, ending in 1638.  The remnants of the tribe allied themselves with the English in 
King Philip’s War. 
 
Wampanoag. An Algonquian tribe residing in the southeastern coast of Massachusetts in the 
seventeenth century.  Notable sachems included Massasoit and Metacom, alias Philip, the Indian 
leader of King Philip’s War. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The day was cold with snow thick on the ground as the troops of the United Colonies 
marched from their headquarters to the edge of a sodden bog.  Their guide had assured them that 
their adversaries would be here, in a fort the enemy was sure would be protected by the 
treacherous landscape surrounding it.  The soldiers waited on the edge of the swamp, and as their 
demands were refused shots began to ring sharp through the air.  The battle had begun and the 
colonial forces were ready with a plan.  They laid siege to the fort, igniting wigwams with 
families inside while killing anyone could they find.  The enemy soon succumbed to the 
sweeping forces of the English, fleeing quickly into the countryside, having no time to take 
clothing, food, or water in their haste.  The number of the enemy left lying dead in the fort had 
been in the hundreds.  It would never be known how many perished in the cold winter night 
without provisions or had been burned alive in their homes.  The English celebrated their victory, 
thanking God for their success and celebrating the carnage they had left in their wake. 
 The day was December 19, 1675 and the massacred enemy was the Narragansett Indians 
of southeastern New England, whom the English believed were supporting the Wampanoag 
combatants in the ongoing conflict known as King Philip’s War, an Indian revolt led by 
Metacom, the sachem of the Wampanoag tribe.  The massacre became known as the Great 
Swamp Fight, and represented the culmination of tensions between the English and 
Narragansetts.  English policy would not allow for Native Americans to openly defy the 
2 
 
authority of the colonies without consequences.  In this case and throughout colonial history, the 
Indians paid for their defiance with death.
1
 
 The relationship between the English and the Narragansetts that ultimately led to the 
Great Swamp Fight is worth understanding because it exemplifies the past and the future of 
English policy towards Native Americans that would later lead to their downfall within the 
United States.  A relationship between the Narragansetts and the English grew with the advent of 
the Pequot War in the 1630s.  The Narragansetts formed an alliance with the English to eliminate 
their Pequot enemies and win disputed territory. In this instance, the Narragansetts were 
successful but their relationship with the English would become strained after witnessing brutal 
English tactics used on the Pequots, a forewarning of the same tactics that would be unleashed 
on them in King Philip’s War.  The Narragansetts would also come to realize that English 
interests were exclusive to the good of the English, not beneficial to the Indian tribes of southern 
New England.  Meanwhile, the Mohegan tribe of Connecticut remained a strong English ally 
during and after the Pequot War.  The Narragansetts, however, became embroiled in conflict 
with the Connecticut tribe and their sachem, Uncas, in the 1640s.  The English refused to 
mediate the conflict and their alliance with the Mohegans would become a major point of 
hesitation when the Narragansetts were considering joining the English in King Philip’s War.2 
 The Narragansetts were beginning to see the English more as rivals than as potential 
allies when King Philip’s War broke out in 1675 against Metacom, the sachem of the 
Wampanoag tribe.  The English looked to the Narragansetts for support as they had done in the 
earlier Pequot War, but the Narragansetts were reluctant to join a new alliance with the colonists 
                                                 
1
 Elisha R. Potter, The Early History of Narragansett (Providence: Marshall, Brown, and Co., 1835), 85-92. 
2
 Daniel Mandell, King Philip’s War: The Conflict Over New England (New York: Infobase Publishing, 
2007), 33-39. 
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after all they had witnessed over the past decades.  This hesitation and acts of Narragansett 
support for Metacom, such as harboring fugitive Wampanoags, would become the catalyst for 
the Great Swamp Fight and eventual weakening of the Narragansetts, Wampanoags, and their 
allies. 
Despite the violent relationship between the Narragansetts and the English, it is worth 
noting that there were success stories of Native American-colonial relationships.  John Eliot was 
a devoted Puritan who emigrated to Boston in 1631.  Soon after arriving, he began studying 
Native American languages and started preaching in them.  He became determined to convert 
Native Americans to Christianity, establishing villages for Native American converts, who were 
called “Praying Indians.”  Eliot was eventually able to set up fourteen such villages for the 
converts, though the anglicized Indians would later be swept up by King Philip’s War and their 
towns ultimately destroyed to make room for colonial settlers.
3
 Regardless of the fate of the 
“Praying Indians,” the mere establishment of fourteen villages for converted Indians illustrated 
that there had been an English inclination to try to live harmoniously with Native Americans.  It 
showed that not all English colonists wanted to adopt a violent approach in dealing with Native 
Americans.
4
  Though Eliot refused to live with Indians unless they were Christianized, his 
missionary-style approach showed that some English thought Indians and colonists could live 
together, but with the qualification that Indians become “anglicized.”  This idea, however, was 
never able to come to fruition after King Philip’s War. 
                                                 
3
 "John Eliot," Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th edition, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. 
4
 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815 (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1991).  White’s work describes accommodations and negotiations 
made by Indians and Europeans in the Great Lakes region, exemplifying that there were alternatives to the 
polarizing approach of the Indians and English colonists in New England. 
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 The story of Narragansett interaction illustrated the beginnings of a tragic colonial 
relationship between the Native Americans and English colonists.  The actions of the English left 
the Narragansetts with few choices except to become an enemy of the colonies.  The historical 
alliance with the English was the ultimate cause of hesitation in renewing that same alliance in 
King Philip’s War.  They knew their allies well enough to know that they would be better off as 
enemies.  The English, however, would not back down, continuing to pursue an agreement with 
the tribe and finally gaining one through deception.  Still, the colonists seemed surprised that the 
Narragansetts refused to follow the terms of such an unwanted allegiance.  The English would 
not allow such open disloyalty, attacking the Narragansetts and causing the tribe to finally give 
their full support to Metacom for the rest of the war before they were fully weakened by English 
forces.  Studying the English relationship with the Narragansetts throughout King Philip’s War is 
helpful in understanding English policy toward Native Americans and why many of the Indian 
tribes of New England eventually sided with the Wampanoags during King Philip’s War. The 
aggressive English pursuit of an alliance with the Narragansetts drove the tribe to eventually side 
with Philip and the Wampanoags and symbolized the destructive relationship between the 
English and the Indians of North America. 
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HISTORIOGRAPHY OF KING PHILIP’S WAR 
King Philip’s War has been viewed through various lenses over time, from interpretations 
that insisted both the English and Native Americans were fighting for extermination of the other, 
to one of a civil war, to the formation of an American national identity stemming from the war.  
Some of the earliest works on King Philip’s War are from the nineteenth century, which often 
focused on the degradation of the Indians in New England after King Philip’s War.  Elisha Potter 
wrote The Early History of Narragansett in 1835.  Potter often portrayed the English poorly, 
citing their dishonesty when it came to dealing with Indians.  Potter even mocked the English for 
being offended by Indian practices, writing, “the Indians it seems had rejoiced at the success of 
their friends ! How improper ! Probably if the Indians had their festival in the shape of a fast or a 
thanksgiving, their opponents would not have been offended.”5  The context of the time period is 
paramount in understanding the sentiment of Potter.  Only five years earlier, President Andrew 
Jackson had instituted the Indian Removal Act, which began a series of forceful removals of 
Indian tribes located in the southern region of the United States from their homelands.  Potter 
was writing during this time of forced removal was and his personal opinion on the matter of 
Indian injustices came through his work.  
A more modern and less biased interpretation was offered by David Leach, who wrote 
Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War in 1958, breaking a period of 
silence on the subject that had held since the beginning of the century.  Leach maintained that 
King Philip’s War affected both the colonists and the eastern Algonquian tribes equally.  Leach 
                                                 
5
 Potter, 82-83. 
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wrote, “It was a crisis of staggering proportions, threatening to undo much of the careful work 
that had been accomplished [by the English].  No society can pass through such a crisis without 
experiencing deep and abiding changes.  Similarly, the Indians were hurling themselves, for 
better or for worse, into a new stage of existence.  They too would never be the same again.”6  
Leach argued that both New England and Algonquian society had been forever changed by the 
conflict, but he also, more interestingly, argued that both had tried to exterminate the other.
7
  
This interpretation is helpful in understanding the brutal tactics that were used by either side in 
King Philip’s War.  It is also helpful since it demonstrates the tragic conclusion of the colonial 
relationship between the Indians and the English in southern New England, describing the extent 
to which both sides went to try to exterminate the other. 
 More than thirty years after Leach, Russell Bourne wrote The Red King’s Rebellion: 
Racial Politics in New England 1675-1678.  The theories behind the war had evolved to consider 
it not as a war between two different peoples, but a civil war, implying that the English and 
Algonquian Indians had created a shared society in the years since the colonists’ first arrival.  
Bourne argued that a harmonious society had existed between the groups before a new group of 
settlers began arriving in the latter part of the seventeenth century and began excluding Native 
Americans from any meaningful participation in society.
8
  This understanding delved deeper into 
the relationship between the English settlers of New England and their Indian counterparts.  It 
showed a complex relationship had existed between the two groups that led to the creation of a 
                                                 
6
 Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1958), viii. 
7
 Ibid., 250. 
8
 Russell Bourne, The Red King’s Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England 1675-1678 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), xii-39. 
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new, shared society.  When this society was questioned by newly arriving colonists, the eastern 
Algonquians would not allow for their sovereignty to be taken away, igniting King Philip’s War. 
Less than a decade later, Jill Lepore wrote The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the 
Origins of American Identity, in which she presented an entirely new and compelling 
interpretation of King Philip’s War.  She claimed that the war helped forge an American identity 
for the first time.  She looked at narratives that were written in great volume and immediately 
after the war.  These narratives allowed for the colonists’ viewpoint to be remembered in history 
rather than the views of any Native Americans.  Indians could be portrayed as barbaric and 
savage without any dispute since that was the only viewpoint present.
9
  This idea was 
perpetuated throughout generations of Americans, with plays such as Metamora, romanticizing 
the death of Philip, allowing Indians to become American heroes since they now only existed in 
the past.  Lepore analyzed the memory of King Philip’s War to create a work that did not limit 
itself to the events of the actual war, but considered the way its legacy has affected Americans 
through the generations. 
In the years after Lepore, there have been returns to some of the older interpretations.  
James Drake wrote King Philip’s War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 one year after 
Lepore but described an interpretation similar to that of Bourne. Drake believed that the war was 
not a clash of cultures or frontier conflict between Indians and whites, but a civil war “whose 
divisions cut across simple ethnic lines and tore apart a society composed of English colonizers 
and Native Americans alike.”10  Drake argued that Native Americans were as much a part of the 
                                                 
9
 Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1998), 46. 
 
10
 James Drake, King Philip’s War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 (Amherst, Massachusetts: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 260. 
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settler society as an English settler, just in a different capacity.  The English wished to rule over 
the Indian tribes of New England rather than totally remove them from the area.  Drake cited 
charters, which stated that the English wanted to convert Indians to Christianity, rather than 
eradicate them from the area, as well as Indian wishes for protection from the English, as 
evidence that the Indians and English had wished to coexist and were part of the same society.
11
  
Similar to Bourne, Drake’s work showed the complexities of the society that existed before King 
Philip’s War, intimating that the causes of the war were more complex than English genocidal 
ambitions. 
Most recently, in 2007, Daniel Mandell wrote King Philip’s War: The Conflict Over New 
England.  Mandell looked back to one of the most traditional interpretations of King Philip’s 
War to offer a basic overview of the war, helpful in gaining a preliminary understanding of the 
preceding conflicts and the events of the war. Mandell concluded by describing a complete loss 
of Indian independence in the region.  He stated that Native American numbers in New England 
dropped from twenty-five percent to just ten percent of the entire regional population.  Mandell 
further explained that, “While there remained in the area about 25 communities with territories 
(of various sizes) reserved for their use and residence, only the Narragansetts and Mohegans 
retained a substantive level of autonomy, retaining their sachems and councils without the direct 
oversight of guardians appointed by the provincial legislatures.”12  Though the Mohegans had 
allied with the English, they received little to no spoils for their support, only gaining new tribe 
members who had directly surrendered to them rather than the English.  As Mandell made clear, 
though tribes like the Narragansetts and Mohegans were able to maintain some level of 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., 37, 108. 
12
 Mandell, 117-118. 
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autonomy, even English allies gained nothing substantial after the war and the vast majority of 
Native Americans were left in a state of utter devastation.  Daniel Mandell clearly illustrated the 
most popular interpretation of King Philip’s War which began with cultural clashes culminating 
in the death of John Sassamon and continued on to bring about the almost complete eradication 
of Indian autonomy in New England. 
The different interpretations concerning King Philip’s War explain why this conflict was 
not simple.  The interpretations offer a better understanding of the complex relationship between 
New England Indians and settlers and how they eventually reached a boiling point that spilled 
over into one of the bloodiest wars fought in American history.  They also show a change in 
mindset over time.  Directly after the aggressive Indian Removal Act, Potter published his work 
on the history of the Narragansetts and their involvement in King Philip’s War.  David Leach 
was writing in the late 1950s, a time when the civil rights movement was just beginning and 
there was not much attention being paid to the misfortune of Native Americans in the history of 
the United States.  By the last decade of the twentieth century, the plight of the Indians of North 
America was taught to every elementary school student and early native history was no longer 
ignored.  The interpretations of King Philip’s War mirrored this, as the reasons behind the 
conflict became more intricate, taking into account many more viewpoints than just that of the 
English. 
The argument being currently presented in this thesis fits into a category that has not been 
explored by many historians in the past, with few exceptions.
13
  Focusing on the relationship 
between the Narragansetts and the English, this thesis looks to discover the reasons for the 
                                                 
13
 Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects onto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Conquest for Authority in 
New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).  Pulsipher’s book is an exception to the almost 
total silence concerning Narragansett involvement in King Philip’s War and their strategic importance to the 
English.  Pulsipher dedicates one chapter of her work to describing the English desire for a Narragansett alliance 
during King Philip’s War. 
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violent culmination of the colonial relationship between the English and Indians of southern New 
England.  By exploring the dynamics of the questionable alliance between the Narragansetts and 
the English, one can understand the pressure that the English put on their Indian allies, which left 
the Narragansetts with no other choice but to fully submit to the English or to fight.  
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I. THE NARRAGANSETTS BEFORE KING PHILIP’S WAR 
History of the Narragansett Tribe 
 
 In the seventeenth century, the Narragansett tribe occupied a large area of the current 
state of Rhode Island, including the entirety of Washington County in the south and areas of 
Kent County.
14
  They were part of a larger Algonquian Indian group, including the 
Wampanoags, Mohegans, Pequots, and Nipmucs.  Narragansett myth and legend maintained that 
the tribe had always lived in this territory.  Roger Williams stated that the Narragansetts believed 
“‘that they have sprung and growne up in that very place, like the very trees of the 
wildernesse.’”15  This showed that the Narragansetts had been in the New England region for an 
extremely long time, where they grew and eventually created a wide sphere of influence over 
many of the neighboring tribes. 
 The Narragansett way of life revolved around the nearby waters of Narragansett Bay, 
making fish a staple of their diet.  They lived in basic buildings or huts and wore simple clothing 
(at least from the English point of view).  Their character, however, was not simple.  They were 
often depicted by the English as strong, brave, and generous people.  William Hubbard, a 
clergyman in New England who had extensive contact with Native Americans through 
missionary efforts, stated that the Narragansetts were “always more civil and courteous to the 
English than  any  of the  other  Indians.”16  General Gookin  of  Massachusetts, a man who often  
                                                 
14
 See Appendix I for a map of Narragansett territory.  
15
 Henry C. Dorr, “The Narragansetts,” in Collections of the Rhode Island Historical Society, ed. William 
E. Foster, (Providence: Kellogg Printing Company, 1885), 7:138. 
16
 Potter, 8. 
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traveled into Indian settlements, supervised one of the first praying towns and composed two 
works about the Indians he constantly encountered, also praised the Narragansetts, stating, “they 
are an active, laborious and ingenious people, which is demonstrated in their labors they do for 
the English; of whom more are employed, especially in making stone fences and many other 
hard labors, than of any other Indian people or neighbors.”17  Roger Williams also testified to the 
character of the Narragansetts, writing, “Drunkenness and gluttony generally they know not what 
sins they be; and although they have not so much to restrain them, (both in respect of knowledge 
of God and laws of men) as the English have, yet a man shall never hear of such crimes amongst 
them of robberies, murthers, adulteries, &c.”18  These writers offered a testament to the spirit of 
the Narragansetts.  It was noteworthy that English writers would portray the Narragansetts 
favorably since the English harbored many suspicions toward the tribe even before they openly 
defied the English in King Philip’s War.  The excerpts from Hubbard, Gookin, and Williams 
offered a generally positive description of the Narragansett people. 
The Narragansetts were also versed in commerce before English arrival, supplying other 
Indian nations with pendants, bracelets, tobacco pipes, and pottery.  When colonists arrived, they 
quickly began a trade with the English and other European powers in the area, making a profit by 
receiving furs in exchange for Narragansett goods.
19
  The Narragansett tribe was hierarchically 
structured with two chief sachems and several subordinate ones.  Though succession generally 
remained within a familial line, the heir was not always explicitly defined, as was the case in the 
primogeniture practices of England.   
                                                 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid., 9. 
19
 Ibid., 8. 
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Lastly, the Narragansetts believed in a system of gods, Kautantowit being the principal 
one and also known as the South West god, because the southwest wind was the most desirable 
of all the wind patterns in New England.  They believed that souls, called Cowwewonck, 
operated while the body slept and souls of common men and women would go to the South West 
upon death.  The souls of great Narragansetts would go to Kautantowit’s house with the promise 
of corporeal joys, while the souls of murderers, thieves, and liars were doomed to wander 
restlessly.
20
 Narragansett beliefs and traditions would have been strange to the English, causing 
the colonists to believe themselves superior to not only the Narragansetts, but all Indian tribes.  
Though the English would have seen the advantages of friendship with the tribes of New 
England, their traditions and customs would undoubtedly have made the English question the 
complexities and sophistication of Indian society, being so different from European ideals, and 
led the English to seek submission from their native counterparts. 
Upon first arrival, however, the English respected the Narragansetts due to their vast 
power.  Neighboring Algonquian tribes included the Cowesits in the north and the Sawomet and 
Nipmucs in the northwest.  Each paid tribute to the more powerful Narragansetts, widening their 
sphere of influence. In 1620, Narragansett power grew with the arrival of the English at 
Plymouth.  At this time, disease ravaged the Indians of the area, weakening all the Algonquian 
tribes in the area. The Narragansetts, however, remained untouched by the epidemic, allowing 
them to extend their influence over their disease ravaged and crippled counterparts, including the 
Wampanoags, the eventual instigators of King Philip’s War over fifty years later.21 As more 
English settlers arrived to the southeastern shore of New England they started to recognize the 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 10-11. 
21
 Ibid., 1-2. 
14 
 
Narragansetts as the most dominant tribe.  The perception of Narragansett power drove the 
English to seek an alliance with the important tribe early on, whether the Narragansetts actually 
desired this alliance would not be considered by the English.  
 Though Narragansett strength lay partially in the tribe’s numbers, since it had not been 
affected by disease, it was impossible to accurately number the tribe owing to their lifestyle of 
mixed subsistence farming, which caused them to move constantly.  Estimates, however, reached 
as high as thirty thousand and the warrior force may have been as high as five thousand.  Some 
even claimed that the Narragansetts were the largest of all Indian tribes between Boston and the 
Hudson River.
22
  Whether these estimates were truly accurate was not as important as the 
recognition that the English settlers first gave to the Narragansetts because of their perceived 
strength.  After their arrival, the earliest settlers soon realized that the Narragansetts were greater 
in number and force than they, making it essential to their survival that they adopt a friendly 
policy toward the tribe.
23
  This policy would have suited the Narragansetts, allowing them to 
gain more power through English backing.  It also would have compelled the Narragansetts to 
join the English in a war against the Pequot tribe of Connecticut; a tribe that the Narragansetts 
had been in constant dispute with over territorial claims in the past.  With English backing, the 
Narragansetts would finally be able to gain the much-coveted territory of the Pequot Indians.  
For this purpose, an English alliance served Narragansett interests of expansion. 
 
 
 
English-Narragansett Alliance During the Pequot War of 1634-1638 
 
                                                 
22
 Potter, 6. 
23
 Dorr, 142. 
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 Narragansett involvement in conflicts between Native Americans and the English did not  
begin with King Philip’s War.  The Narragansett tribe had a long tradition of interacting with 
English colonists, owing to the fact that they were one of the largest and most powerful tribes in 
southern New England.  This interaction would play out in the Pequot War, which preceded 
King Philip’s War by more than thirty years.  Narragansetts became directly involved in the 
conflict after forging an alliance with the English.  The war began when, the Pequot sachem, 
looking to make a truce with Narragansetts after a conflict over trading rights, approached 
Massachusetts Bay Colony and offered them a permanent trading post on the Connecticut River.  
In exchange, Massachusetts would help the Pequots broker peace with the Narragansetts.  The 
desire of Massachusetts, however, could not be satisfied with a lone trading post.  Massachusetts 
required the Pequot tribe to relinquish the title of the entire Connecticut River Valley as well as 
pay tribute to the colony.
24
  This agreement became one of the major catalysts for the Pequot 
War and an example of one of the early instances of English involvement in Indian affairs.  This 
involvement, however, culminated poorly for the Indian counterpart, as the Pequots would be 
totally eradicated from their homelands by the end of the war.  The pattern of English 
involvement leading to the eventual demise of an Indian tribe began with the Pequots and would 
continue into King Philip’s War. 
  Though the Narragansetts were hesitant about joining in an alliance with the English, 
they were eventually persuaded to sign a treaty with Massachusetts Bay Colony, mostly due to 
their rivalry with the Pequot tribe and desire for revenge after the Pequots tried to attack the 
Dutch-Narragansett trading alliance.
25
  The treaty was signed on October 21, 1636 and contained 
                                                 
24
 Mandell, 20. 
25
 Potter, 23. 
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nine conditions: 1) a firm peace between the English and Narragansetts must exist; 2) there could 
be no peace with the Pequots without the other’s consent; 3) Narragansetts were forbidden from 
harboring any Pequots during the war; 4) the Narragansetts must kill or deliver all murderers to 
the English; 5) any fugitive servants must be returned to the English; 6) the English will give the 
tribe notice whenever they decide to launch an attack against the Pequots; 7) a right of free trade 
will continually exist between the colonists and the Narragansetts; 8) The Narragansetts are 
prohibited from travelling near any English plantations; and 9) A continual posterity will exist 
between the Narragansett tribe and the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
26
  The Narragansetts were 
considered one of the largest and most powerful tribes of southern New England, and the terms 
of the above treaty seem to suggest that the English wanted to check this power.  The English 
were careful to include clauses stating that continual trade and posterity would always exist 
between the Narragansetts and the colonists, making sure that the colonies would benefit most 
from the Narragansetts’ influence over many of the local Indian tribes.  Furthermore, the English 
denied the Narragansetts any chance to negotiate with the Pequots where they could potentially 
set up their own territorial deals with the tribe.  The treaty exemplified English ambitions to 
control the Indians of New England. 
 Seven months after the Narragansett-English treaty had been signed, on May 26, 1637 the 
English attacked the Pequot tribe at a fort on the Mystic River in Connecticut.
27
  William 
Bradford, the governor of Plymouth Colony, described the attack: “Those [Pequots] that escaped 
the fire were slain by sword, some hewed to pieces, some run through with rapiers, &c.  The 
number thus destroyed was about 400.  At this time it was a fearful sight to see them thus frying 
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 John Winthrop, The Journal of John Winthrop 1630-1649, eds. Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, and 
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in the fire and the streams of blood quenching the same, and horrible was the stink scent thereof; 
but the victory seemed a sweet sacrifice, and they gave the praise thereof to God, who had 
wrought so wonderfully for them; thus to enclose their enemies in their hands.”28  The excerpt 
describes a scene filled with senseless violence on the part of the English.
29
  The Pequot Indians 
were massacred without regret and many colonists thought this show of brutality a blessing from 
God, unable to see it for what it was – a massacre of men, women, and children.  Witnesses of 
this attack included the Narragansett warriors who watched in horror as Pequots were brutally 
killed by the English.  These barbaric tactics disgusted the Narragansetts and would make the 
tribe reconsider forming any close future alliances with colonists.
30
 
 Brutal tactics were not the only contributing factor to the feeling of Narragansett 
uncertainty concerning their alliance.  At the conclusion of the war, the process of dividing the 
spoils began.  Particularly heated conflicts arose between the sachem of the Mohegans, Uncas, 
and Miantonomo, the Narragansett sachem.  Both tribes had fought for the colonies and both 
sachems thought they deserved more land and captives than the other.  A treaty was eventually 
brokered by the English between the two tribes, which required all future complaints between the 
two to be presented to the English.  It further stated that a tax must be paid for each captive 
Pequot they already held.  It then stipulated that both the Narragansetts and Mohegans would 
receive an equal number of any remaining Pequots, as it was common practice for the victor of 
Indian wars to add the conquered Indians to their tribes.  Lastly, the treaty claimed all Pequot 
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territory solely for the English.
31
  The treaty ignored the interests of the Narragansetts, who 
entered the war with the hopes of extending their lands into Pequot territory.  The Narragansetts 
hoped the English would help them gain this goal but instead of dividing the land between their 
allies, the English claimed everything for themselves, a clear indication of their low respect for 
their “friends” and the fear that the English undoubtedly had concerning the amplification of 
Narragansett power.   
 The English believed that their history of alliance with the Narragansetts would allow for 
the same relationship in King Philip’s War.  In 1675, at the outbreak of the conflict, John 
Winthrop, Jr., the colonial governor of Connecticut wrote, “the Nahigansetts have hitherto 
continued in amity w
th 
the English, and were voluntarily very helpfull to them in those warrs w
th
 
the Pequots.”32  The statement expressed no doubt that the Narragansetts would side with the 
English during this new conflict due their history in the Pequot War and the supposed “amity” 
that existed between the tribe and the English.  The Narragansetts, however, saw things in a 
different light. The failure to receive any territory, coupled with the witnessing of the barbaric 
tactics used against the Pequots, caused the Narragansetts to second-guess their alliance with the 
English.  These thoughts would play on the minds of the Narragansett tribe when, forty years 
later, the English approached them to create a new alliance during King Philip’s War. 
Narragansett-Mohegan Conflict 
 
                                                 
31
 Mandell, 32. 
32
 John Winthrop, Jr., to Major Savage and other officers of the army, July 12, 1675, The Winthrop Papers, 
Paul Campbell Research Notes, Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence, 173.  The Paul Campbell Research 
Notes manuscript collection was compiled by Paul Campbell and Glenn LaFantasie when, in 1975, the Narragansett 
Indians filed a suit to regain lands in southern Rhode Island.  The research notes contain over 9,000 documents that 
date as far back to 1524, as described by the Rhode Island Historical Society.  (Paul Campbell Research Notes will 
be known as PCRN from this point forward.) 
19 
 
 Only five years after the close of the Pequot War, two former English allies, the 
Narragansetts and Mohegans, came into conflict with one another.  The void left by the Pequot 
tribe made the Mohegans and Narragansetts the two most influential tribes in the region, 
resulting in constant friction between them.
33
  In July of 1643, the Mohegan sachem, Uncas, 
registered a complaint with Connecticut after he was attacked by a Wongunk war party, a smaller 
tribe that resided in the western area of the colony.  Connecticut issued Uncas permission to 
exact revenge.  Miantonomo, of the Narragansetts, had previously committed to protecting the 
Wongunk tribe and upon hearing the situation, he looked to Massachusetts to grant him 
permission to attack Uncas.  With the authority of the Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay 
behind the Mohegans and Narragansetts, respectively, a Narragansett war party attacked Uncas 
and the Mohegans.  Uncas, however, was able to defeat the war party and captured Miantonomo, 
eventually executing him after English authorities ruled for Miantonomo’s death by Uncas.34  
 Writing in the 1670s, William Hubbard described the conflict between the Mohegans and 
Narragansetts.  Hubbard’s description begins in 1642, before the conflict reached its boiling 
point.  Letters had arrived to Boston from Connecticut, warning that Indians were conspiring to 
cut off the English throughout the entire area.  These letters were coming at a time when 
colonists already believed that Miantonomo was organizing all Indians throughout the country to 
start “a  general  conspiracy  against  the  English.”35  Hubbard  described  the  details  that   were  
known of the supposed Indian conspiracy:  
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The time appointed to be for the assault, was said to be after 
harvest; the manner to be by several companies, entering into the 
chief men’s houses, by way of trade, and then to kill them in their 
houses, and seize their arms and others should be at hand to 
prosecute the massacre: This was also confirmed by three Indians 
that were said to reveal it in the same manner, and at the same 
time, to Mr. Ludlow and to the Governor of New-Haven… Upon 
this, their advice from Connecticut was, that we should begin with 
them and enter upon a war presently… But the General Court of 
Massachusetts when called together, did not think those 
informations to be a sufficient ground whereon to begin a war… it 
was considered, that the reports of all Indians were found by 
experience to be very uncertain.
36
 
 
The excerpt exemplifies the attitude that Indian reports were not to be believed by colonists for 
the sole reason that they came from an Indian.  Massachusetts did not agree to Connecticut’s 
suggestion of warfare against the Narragansetts because, despite the thirty eyewitness 
testimonies given by Indians, they did not think it was enough to prove the story.  Also 
exemplified is the idea that the English already suspected the Narragansetts of planning a region-
wide conspiracy against the English when Miantonomo was captured, which would affect their 
ruling on Miantonomo’s execution. The pre-conceived notion that the Narragansetts may be 
starting a conspiracy combined with beliefs of the fallacy of Indian testimony would easily lead 
the court in Boston to reach the decision to allow Uncas to execute Miantonomo. 
 Hubbard related the English justification for the swift execution of Miantonomo, 
claiming that the execution would finally lead to peace: “his head was cut off by Uncas, it being 
justly feared, that there would never be any firm peace, either betwixt the English and the 
Narragansets, or betwixt the Narragansets and the Mohegins, while Miantonimo was left alive: 
However, the Narragansets have ever since that time bore an implacable malice against Uncas, 
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and all the Mohegins, and for the sakes secretly against the English.”37 The hope that peace 
would be the end result of Miantonomo’s execution derived from the English belief that 
Miantonomo was leading an Indian revolt against the English.  The excerpt demonstrated how 
the English must have believed that Miantonomo was behind the alleged Indian conspiracy 
against the English.  The English believed that Miantonomo was a powerful aggressor and that 
his death would stop any feelings of rebellion the Narragansetts were harboring because their 
leader would be eradicated.  The colonists could not have been more wrong.  Hubbard intimated 
that Miantonomo’s death produced a greater feeling of Narragansett enmity toward the 
Mohegans and Uncas, who would become one of the strongest English allies in King Philip’s 
War, and caused the Narragansetts to never fully trust the English again, which would ultimately 
affect their future alliance. 
 The Narragansett-Mohegan conflict succeeded in bringing the English and the Mohegans 
closer together.  After Miantonomo’s execution, the English pledged to protect the Mohegans 
against any Narragansett attacks.  The United Colonies proclaimed that, “Uncus being in 
confedation with us, and one that hath diligently observed his Covenants before mention for 
ought we know, and requiring advice from us upon serious consideration of the premisss, viz/ his 
[Miantonomo’s] treacherous and murtherous Disposition against Uncus etc. and how great A 
Disturber hee hath beene of the Comon peace of the whole colony…Hartford [shall] furnish 
Uncus with a competent strengh of English to defend him against any present fury or assault of 
the Nanohigunsets or any other.”38  The Commissioners of the United Colonies did not make any 
attempt to hide their feelings toward Miantonomo, calling him a disturber of peace for the entire 
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New England region.  With statements like these, it is not hard to understand why the 
Narragansetts would not commit to an alliance with the English in King Philip’s War.  The 
commitment of a force to defend the Mohegans against any Narragansett retaliation was yet 
another blow to the English-Narragansett relationship, as the colonists had plainly sided with 
Uncas and the Mohegans.  The Narragansetts would not soon forget the support given to the 
Mohegans and the English defamation of Miantonomo. 
 The English, however, had a much shorter memory.  From the start of King Philip’s War, 
representatives of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were sent to Narragansett 
country, looking to persuade the Narragansetts to ally with them.  The Narragansetts, however, 
had not forgotten their conflict with the Mohegans of the 1640s and the English friendship with 
that same tribe.  In June of 1675, Roger Williams wrote to the Governor of Connecticut, John 
Winthrop, discussing the Narragansett enmity with Uncas.  The letter addressed whether Uncas 
had potentially stirred up Canonicus, the new Narragansett sachem, to attack the Showatucks, a 
small eastern Algonquian tribe.  Williams wrote, “Canonicus utterly denies that Uncas ever 
solicited him to kill or molest those Showatuks…it is not credible that since Uncas killed his 
brother Miantonomo, he (Canonicus) should be solicited by Uncas in such a business, or that he 
should gratify Uncas desires, &c.”39  The statement offered explicit evidence that the 
Narragansetts would never be able to work with the Mohegans.  Canonicus had intimated to 
Roger Williams that the killing of Miantonomo is still fresh in the minds of the Narragansetts 
and that Uncas could never have an influence over his tribe. 
 Canonicus was not the only Narragansett who refused to work with Uncas. Ninigret, 
sachem of the smaller Niantic tribe within the Narragansett nation, had originally claimed loyalty 
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to the English early in King Philip’s War.40  This loyalty, however, did not include fraternizing 
with the Mohegan sachem.
41
  In a letter by Wait Winthrop to his father John Winthrop, Jr., Wait 
related Ninigret’s sentiment that he would not meet with the English if any of Uncas’ men 
accompany them to the meeting.
42
  A tribe like the Niantics, which was closely related to the 
Narragansetts, showed how deeply the conflict with the Mohegans had entrenched itself into 
their society.  The Niantics openly allied themselves with the English, yet they refused to 
cooperate with the Mohegans, an extremely important ally for the English in the war.  Had the 
English taken note of these warning signs, they may have realized that Narragansett conflict with 
the Mohegans would not allow them to easily take the side of the English because of the deep-
seated conflict that existed between the two tribes. Yet this would certainly not be the only 
reason for Narragansett hesitation. 
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II. NARRAGANSETT INVOLVEMENT IN KING PHILIP’S WAR  
Roots of King Philip’s War 
  
The conflicts that precipitated King Philip’s War began to take shape in 1660, after the 
death of the Wampanoag sachem, Massasoit.  In 1621, Massasoit made a treaty with Plymouth 
colony, hoping that it would help prevent Narragansett expansion in the area, as the 
Narragansetts were a traditional enemy of the Wampanoags.  When the colonists first arrived, 
Massasoit was not the only Native American to believe that the Europeans could offer them 
protection.  Other Indian sachems in Massachusetts and Connecticut also created alliances with 
the English.  The alliances, however, were seen differently in the eyes of the Indians versus those 
of the English.  The Indians saw the English as similar to themselves, and their recent arrival 
meant a new entity could now be secured as a valuable trading partner and political ally, 
protecting them against their traditional Indian rivals.  The English, however, saw their 
relationships with the Algonquian Indians as a means of establishing a lasting foothold in the 
area.
43
  To the English, establishing themselves equated to owning as much land as they possibly 
could, resulting in land deals to be attached to many treaties that the English made with the 
Native Americans of New England.  The main intention of the English was to secure as much 
land as possible through these treaties, a fact that the Wampanoag sachem, Metacom, did not 
overlook. 
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After Massasoit’s death, his eldest son, Wamsutta, alias Alexander, took over as 
Wampanoag sachem in 1660.  Wamsutta disregarded the agreements his father had made with 
Plymouth and began selling lands to Rhode Island, worrying Plymouth so greatly that they 
summoned Wamsutta to the colony to discuss his actions.  Mysteriously, however, Wamsutta 
died while traveling to Plymouth, leaving his younger brother, Metacom, to rule the tribe.  
Known to the English as Philip, Metacom was immediately summoned to Plymouth to quickly 
stem any of the same problems that Plymouth had with Wamsutta.  Remembering his brother’s 
mysterious death, Metacom quickly signed a treaty with Plymouth in 1662, stipulating that he 
would never sell land without receiving the consent of Plymouth.  Metacom, however, most 
likely misunderstood the actual terms of the treaty as he had later written that the agreement with 
Plymouth only lasted for seven years, not indefinitely.
44
  The misunderstanding showed that the 
English allowed Metacom to not fully understand the terms of the treaty, most likely because it 
would be easier to persuade him to sign a treaty if he believed it was more favorable to him.  
Additionally, if Metacom tried to fight these controversial stipulations, it would be of little 
consequence since the treaty was set down and already signed by the sachem.  Through 
deception, the English were able to obtain land from the Native Americans in the region. 
 At the same time that Philip agreed to a treaty with Plymouth, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island extended their territories through the installment of new royal charters.  Connecticut 
gained New Haven while Rhode Island incorporated Metacom’s home village of Sowams on the 
Mount Hope peninsula into its colony.
45
  Metacom’s lands were being increasingly encroached 
upon by the English colonies, alarming Metacom and the Wampanoags.  Furthermore, when the 
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English acquired the land they made sure it would be legally impossible for the Indians to ever 
claim the land again, evidenced by the language used in this quitclaim deed to land in Rehoboth 
signed by Metacom in June of 1668:  
I Phillip Sachem eldest son heir and successor to the said 
Osamequin Sachem Do hereby for myself mine heirs assigns and 
successors remise release and forever quit all manner of right title 
claime or interest that I the said Phillip Sachem have, or by any 
colour or prtence whatsoever might or ought to have to the said 
tract of lands... unto... the select men of the town of Rehoboth; ffor 
and to the use of themselves and of all the other Townsmen of the 
said town... and to the use of all and every one of their heirs and 
assigns forever. And ffurthermore I the said Phillip Sachem do 
hereby firmly bind my self mine heirs assigns and successors... 
from all former and other bargains, sales, titles and all other 
incumbrances whatsoever had, made, done, or suffered by me the 
said Phillip Sachem or the said Osamequin deceased my father 
deceased.
46
 
 
In the deed, Philip stated multiple times that he, along with all future sachems of the 
Wampanoags, had given up any claim to the land.  From the wording of the deed it looks as if 
the English hoped there could be no question that Philip and the Wampanoags no longer had any 
right to own or inhabit the land in question, specifically stating that all land rights had been 
transferred to the townsmen of Rehoboth and to their heirs forever.  The amount of repetition and 
strong terms, such as “forever,” illustrated how the English were most concerned with these land 
transfers, rather than with any kind of alliance or friendship with Indians, demonstrating the 
desire for Indian submission to colonial rule.  If a sachem or his tribe ever defied the agreement 
there would be ample evidence in its transcript to deny a tribe of any rights they may have had to 
the land in question. 
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 As deeds similar to this one were becoming more frequent, Metacom was becoming 
infuriated by English disregard for Native land and their constant expansion into Wampanoag 
territory.  In the winter of 1675, an Algonquian Christianized Indian and occasional advisor, 
John Sassamon, attempted to convert Metacom to Christianity.  Instead he discovered that 
Metacom was planning war on the English.  Sassamon immediately divulged this news to the 
governor of Plymouth, but Sassamon, being an Indian, albeit an anglicized one, signified that his 
testimony was untrustworthy and the governor dismissed his claims as falsehoods.  However, 
when Sassamon was found dead in a frozen pond a few weeks later, Plymouth finally took 
Sassamon’s accusations seriously and believed that Metacom had ordered his death in retaliation 
for Sassamon’s betrayal.  In June of 1675, the English tried and executed three of Philip’s chief 
counselors for Sassamon’s death, officially opening hostilities between the English and the 
Wampanoags.
47
 
 In a letter to John Easton, deputy governor of Rhode Island, Metacom listed his 
frustrations with the English and explained why he had decided to go to war.  Easton, being a 
Quaker and harboring a desire for peace, recalled Metacom’s grievances against Puritan 
injustices:  
they [Metacom and his counselors] had a great fear to have ani of 
their indians should be Caled or forsed to be Christian indians... 
thay saied thay had bine the first in doing good to the English, and 
the English the first in doing rong... another greavanc was if 20 of 
there onest indians testefied that a Englishman had dun them 
wrong, it was as nothing, and if but one of ther worst indians 
testefied against an indian or ther king when it plesed the English 
that was sufitiant. a nother grivanc was when ther kings sold land 
the English wold say it was more than thay agred to and a writing 
must be prove against all them, and sum of ther kings had dun rong 
to sell so much  he left his peopell none and sum being given to 
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drunknes the English made them drunk and then cheted them in 
bargens.
48
 
 
Though Easton’s account may have been skewed due to his Quaker leanings, Metacom cited 
these grievances when he finally decided to engage in a full-scale war against the English.  
Metacom described how the English were extremely biased against the Indians even after his 
father, Massasoit, helped to protect the English and taught them how to grow corn.  Metacom 
also complained that the English would not believe Indian testimonies, showing no regard to the 
number of testimonies that corroborate the story.  Lastly, Metacom described how the English 
purposefully supplied Indians with alcohol so they would be drunk when making negotiations, 
making them more likely to agree to prejudicial terms.  For these reasons and the execution of 
his three advisors, Metacom justified a war against the English and received the support of 
Algonquian tribes in the region, including the Awashonks and the Nipmucs.
49
  The English 
would not be outdone in their alliances and turned their attention to friendly Indian tribes to aid 
them against Philip and his allies, especially the large and powerful Narragansett tribe. 
 
 
The Question of Narragansett Alliance 
 The English immediately began their search for Indian allies at the beginning of King 
Philip’s War.  The Pequot and the Mohegan tribe quickly allied themselves with the English.  
The Pequot tribe would have had little choice but an English alliance after the devastation they 
faced in the Pequot War.  The Mohegans, however, took the side of the English in King Philip’s 
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War as a means of gaining the upper hand in their ongoing conflict with the Narragansetts.
50
  
While the Mohegans and Pequots quickly decided to join the English, the decision would not be 
so easy for many Algonquian tribes, including the Narragansetts. 
 The English desperately longed for a Narragansett alliance, as it would have been a huge 
blow for Philip and the Wampanoags.  The Narragansetts could provide a safe haven for 
Wampanoag Indians and strength to the Wampanoag forces, as they were one of the most 
influential and largest tribes in southern New England.  The English realized this advantage early 
on and began sending groups of officers and delegates into Narragansett country to persuade the 
sachems into an English alliance.  Only a month after the start of the war, a letter to the governor 
of Connecticut from his son, Wait Winthrop, described English efforts to ally with the 
Narragansetts.  Wait wrote:  
to prevent the Narrogansets from Joyning w
th
 Philip… we should 
take what force could conveniently be spared with som of the 
moheges and Pequots which seme redy to attend us, and goe to 
narroganset to speake with Nenegraft and the other narroganset 
Sachems… we haue intelligence that 30 or 40 of Philips men are 
come for releife to one of the narroganset Sachems who has sent to 
nenegraft for aduise whether he shall bind and deliver them to the 
English or let them goe, thay say that some of the looser sort of the 
remote narrogansets haue committed some insolences… and there 
are severall hauses which were deserted that are robbed.
51
   
 
It was evident that the English were concerned that the Narragansetts were harboring and helping 
Philip’s warriors and the Wampanoag people.  Winthrop and other colonial leaders believed that 
sending  a  delegate to the  Narragansetts  earlier  would  ensure  that  they  sided with them,  and  
would stop Narragansett “insolence.”  Forming an alliance with the Narragansetts would 
seriously damage Philip’s war effort because it would deprive Philip of a strong outside 
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supporters, allow the English to use Narragansett resources, including their lands, and stem any 
violence directed towards the English in Narragansett country. 
 Wait Winthrop’s father, John, understood the importance of this alliance and discussed it 
in multiple letters to various correspondents. Winthrop stated, “To have an open breach wth 
Naraganset may be of worse cosequece then they are aware.  Its best to keepe & promote peace 
w
th 
them, though w
th bearing some of their ill maners and conniving at some irregularities.”52  
Winthrop advised against any violence with the Narragansetts despite some open hostility with 
the English and emphasized the utility of a peace with the tribe.  This advice demonstrated the 
importance that was placed on a Narragansett alliance because Winthrop did not advocate any 
retaliation against recent burglaries or vandalisms of English homes.  For the English, not to 
retaliate meant that they were extremely concerned about keeping in friendship with the 
Narragansetts and still believed they would eventually be able to bring the tribe into an alliance 
with them. 
 Winthrop went so far as to advise army officers to tread carefully around the 
Narragansetts and, despite some of their suspicious activities, to continue to treat them with 
respect and friendship.  Winthrop even argued that it may have been in the colonies’ interests to 
ignore the fact that Narragansetts were playing host to the Wampanoags.  Winthrop wrote,  
that they are the greatest body of all the heathen neere vs ; that it 
were very good & necessary to have that freindship continued… 
Nor doth it appeare of much consequence to be too strict in inquiry 
about psons fled to them frõ Philip, whether old men or soldiers, 
much lesse women & children… possibly there cãnot but be 
relations, & y
t
 will make a difficulty, and afterward capitulations 
may be more vsefull & sutable then in this tyme of so great hurry.  
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I believe there is difficulty ynough w
th 
that one enemy, & why stir 
vp an other.”53  
  
Winthrop argued that the English could deal with punishing the Narragansetts for harboring 
Wampanoags after the war since it would only be a waste of time and hamper their efforts to 
gain an alliance with the tribe.  Their support was so central to the war effort that Winthrop 
allowed the Narragansetts these concessions, hoping that it would inevitably lead to English 
advantages in the war.  For many colonists, however, the harboring of Wampanoags was a 
situation that could not be overlooked and caused much suspicion concerning the true loyalties of 
the Narragansetts. These suspicions would begin to mount in a few months time after the 
Narragansetts signed a peace treaty with the English yet did not stop harboring English 
enemies.
54
  
 Despite the dire need the English felt for a Narragansett alliance, the tribe maintained 
their neutrality throughout the early months of King Philip’s War.  In June of 1675, Roger 
Williams wrote concerning a Narragansett alliance and relayed the convictions of Canonicus, a 
Narragansett sachem.  Williams stated that Canonicus affirmed that his tribe “will be careful of 
the English and their cattle among them.”55  Though Canonicus was not affirming an alliance 
with the English, he was aware that he should not completely deny any friendship with the 
colonists.  As a means to keep peace and placate the English, Canonicus offered assurance that 
the Narragansetts would not interfere with English private property. 
 Canonicus went as far as offering sympathy for the English after his people had shown a 
disdain for the colonists during the war.  Related by Roger Williams, Canonicus warned the 
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English to flee for their lives from Narragansett country: “his [Canonicus’s] heart affected and 
furrowed for the English, that he could not rule the youth and common people, nor persuade 
others, chief amongst them, except his brother Miantunnomu’s son, Nananautunu.  He advised 
the English at Narragansett to stand upon their guard, to keep strict watch, and, if they could, to 
fortify one or more houses strongly, which if they could not do, then to fly… Canonicus advised 
the English, to take heed of remaining in lone out places, and of travelling in the common 
roads.”56  Canonicus demonstrated his desire for peace when he warned the English of attacks 
that would be made by his own tribe.  Canonicus’s warning and calls for peace also illustrated 
the major problem with any English attainment of an agreement with the Narragansetts.  The 
tribe was divided, young versus old.  The youth wanted war with the English, as Canonicus 
reported to Roger Williams, and an order from the sachem himself would not stop the younger 
Narragansetts from retaliating against the English in their own country.  With this polarized 
Narragansett society, it is not surprising that the English were able to obtain a peace treaty with 
the tribe in July of 1675, but that the tribe’s actions in the months following the treaty were not 
consistent with the terms of the treaty. 
 In July, the English discovered that Philip had sent Wampanoag women and children to 
the Narragansett tribe, clear evidence of preparation for attacks on the English.  In response, the 
Massachusetts infantry was sent to Narragansett country and on July 15, 1675, signed a peace 
treaty with the Narragansetts, though none of the chief sachems were present.
57
 The treaty 
contained seven stipulations governing Narragansett behavior during the war: 1) the 
Narragansetts must deliver any subjects of Philip to the English; 2) they should employ hostility 
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against Philip; 3) deliver any goods stolen from the English back to them; 4) there can never be 
any hostility against the English; 5) the English have the power to take Narragansett hostages to 
ensure that the treaty and its stipulations are carried out fully; 6) the Narragansetts will receive a 
reward of coats for capturing Philip and bringing him to the English; 7) the Narragansetts will 
renew and confirm all past land grants and land conveyances to the English.
58
  The English 
succeeded in signing a treaty with the Narragansetts, but with all chief sachems absent, the peace 
seemed somewhat tenuous.  Though Canonchet, the nephew of Canonicus and son of the 
deceased Miantonomo, eventually traveled to Boston to sign the treaty in October of the same 
year, it was still a recipe for disaster due to the generational and familial conflicts that arose 
within the Narragansett tribe.  After the treaty had become more official with the signature of a 
Narragansett sachem, the tribe still continued to harbor Wampanoags, much to the dismay of the 
English.  The divide between the terms of the treaty and the actions of the Narragansett was a 
result of Canonicus’s inability to rule the youth and the refusal of the youth to submit to the 
English.  Furthermore, the Narragansetts refused to turn away friends or relatives if they were 
seeking refuge.  Many Wampanoags were related to Narragansetts through intertribal marriages 
and the Narragansetts feared what would happen to their relatives if they were left in the hands 
of the English after a previous incident when the English had sold Wampanoags who had 
surrendered out of the country.
59
  The English looked for total obedience from the Narragansetts, 
but for many members of the tribe the English terms were too harsh to ever allow them to submit 
to colonial authority. 
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 The treaty also exemplified the English approach to Indian diplomacy.  The conditions of 
the treaty plainly favored English interests with little regard for what the Narragansetts would 
procure from the agreement, similar to their earlier treaty during the Pequot War.  The 
Narragansetts were required to maintain loyalty to the English, delivering captive Wampanoags 
and returning any stolen goods.  In return for this loyalty, the English were allowed to take 
Narragansett hostages to ensure obedience and Narragansetts received the mere gift of coats for 
capturing the greatest enemy to the English colonists in New England at this time.  It appears 
evident that the English looked down upon the Indians, believing they could establish unfair and 
one-sided treaties without Indian notice of such inequities; it did not go unnoticed by the 
Narragansetts as they continued to support Philip. 
 By November of 1675, the English had become wholly suspicious of the Narragansett 
tribe in aiding Philip and his allies.  They cited Narragansett raids that had been occurring since 
June and had not ceased even after the treaty was signed in July.  Roger Williams described one 
of these attacks in a letter to the governor of Connecticut:  
a party of one hundred Narragansett Indians, armed, marched to 
Warwick, which, as it frightened Warwick, so did it also the 
inhabitants there… it occasioned the English here (and myself) to 
suspect that all the fine words from the Indian sachems to use were 
but words of policy, falsehood and treachery : especially since now 
the English testify, that for divers weeks (if not months) canoes 
passed to and again (day and night between Philip and the 
Narragansetts) and the Narragansett Indians have committed many 
robberies on the English houses.  Also, it is thought that Philip 
durst not have proceeded so far, had he not been assured to have 
been seconded and assisted by the Mohegans and Narragansetts.
60
 
 
The English had already become suspicious of the Narragansett tribe a full month before a treaty 
had been signed due to Narragansett raids into towns such as Warwick and various robberies 
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occurring in English houses, all signs that Philip and the Narragansetts were regularly 
corresponding.  The English were becoming so crazed with suspicion that they began suspecting 
the Mohegans, one of their strongest Indian allies, in also aiding Philip.  Early in the war, some 
English had already cemented the idea in their minds that Indians could never be trusted. 
Narragansett duplicity supported this frame of mind.  As the months wore on, the Narragansetts 
continued to aid the Wampanoags despite signing a peace treaty with the English.  Philip’s 
people continued to look to the Narragansetts as a safe haven throughout the war, while the tribe 
delayed in giving up any Wampanoags to the English regardless of the established treaty.
61
 
 In November of 1675, the Commissioners of the United Colonies drafted an order 
concerning the ongoing disobedience of the Narragansetts.  The commissioners first aired their 
suspicions: “there is much suspicion and probabilities that Indians have been sent from the 
Nahigansetts to the assistance of Phillipians and the other uplanders now in open hostility with 
the English, and that those Nahigansetts have joined with the others in destroying many of the 
English, their houses and goods, at Sprigfeild, Northampton, Deerfield… and that have 
entertained wounded men from those our enemies, and keep constant correspondence with 
them.”62  The commissioners displayed their suspicions that the Narragansetts were violating the 
treaty signed earlier in the year and actively helping Philip in the war effort by citing 
Narragansett actions.  These actions included the destruction of English property in many towns 
as well as caring for and harboring wounded Wampanoags.  As the evidence was mounting 
against the Narragansetts, the commissioners of the United Colonies agreed to send a force into 
Narragansett  country  to  enforce  the  treaty.  They stated that the “Commissioners do agree and 
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determine that forthwith meet persons be appointed empowered to repair to the Nahigansetts and 
demand the delivery of our enemies fled to them for relief and succor, and in case of refusal to be 
prosecuted as the abetters and friends of our enemies.”63 At the official meeting of the United 
Colonies in Boston, the commissioners further agreed to raise a force to send with the delegation 
to Narragansett country, ordering that: 
besides the number of soldiers formerly agreed upon to be raised, 
and to be in constant readiness for the use of the country, there 
shall be 1000 more raised and furnished with arms and provisions 
of all sorts, to be at one hour’s warning for the public service… in 
case they [the raised forces] be not prevented by the Narragansett 
Sachems’ actual performance of their covenants made with the 
commissioners, by delivering up those of our enemies that are in 
their custody, as also making reparations for all damages sustained 
by their neglect hitherto, together with security for their further 
fidelity, then to endeavor the compelling of them thereunto, by the 
best means they may or can, or to proceed against them as our 
enemies.
64
 
 
In both orders, the United Colonies still hoped to keep a peace and alliance with the 
Narragansetts, advising troops sent into the Indian territory to wait for the Narragansetts to act 
first before engaging the Narragansetts in any sort of military attack.  Only if the Narragansetts 
still refused to give up the Wampanoag captives that were in their care would the troops be 
ordered to attack the tribe.  As the orders stated, the Narragansetts would be considered an 
English enemy if they continued to flout the treaty stipulations.  The colonial soldiers sent to 
Narragansett country would treat them as no better. 
 The English, however, had already started to believe that the Narragansetts would turn 
into their enemies even before the expedition into their territory had begun.  A commission was 
sent to Josiah Winslow, the governor of Plymouth Colony, from the United Colonies in 
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November of 1675, expressing a somewhat different sentiment from the official orders they 
issued in the same month.  The commission instructed the commander of forces to march to 
Narragansett country and “vanquish and subdue the cruel, barbarous and treacherous enemy, 
whether Philip Sachem and his Wampanooucks, or the Narrigansets his undoubted allies, or any 
other their friends and abettors…endeavor as silently and suddenly to surprise the enemy as you 
can, and if possible draw or force them to engagement.”65  The order took a much more violent 
and severe approach to Narragansett dissidence.  Upholding the treaty was seen as secondary in 
this order and securing English interests in Narragansett country, along with punishing the 
traitorous Narragansetts, was the primary objective of the expedition.  The private instructions 
sent to the commanders offered a better insight into how the English were actually feeling about 
their Narragansett alliance.  They could no longer deal with Narragansett treachery and their 
suspicions had run so rampant that the English believed the Narragansetts had left them with no 
other option but to attack the tribe, declaring them an adversary.  Suspicions had made the 
strategic importance of alliance with the Narragansetts become less and less important and 
eventually led the English to totally mistrust the tribe. 
In 1675, Commissioners of the United Colonies made their grievances against the 
Narragansetts sound grave and somber.  The commissioners’ goal was to make it appear as if 
there was no other viable option besides total engagement of the Narragansetts because they 
could not allow a tribe of such barbarous and traitorous individuals to openly defy them.  Since 
the Narragansetts would not be subject to English authority, the colonists finally decided to 
openly attack the tribe.  By December, the forces ordered up by the Commissioners of the United 
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Colonies had reached Narragansett country under the command of Josiah Winslow, governor of 
Plymouth, making their headquarters in Wickford.  William Hubbard recounted the events of the 
next few days in his narrative of King Philip’s War, describing how the colonial forces began 
launching small attacks on Indians almost daily from their headquarters.  One such attack took 
place on the fourteenth of December, when a company marched into Narragansett country and 
burned one hundred and fifty wigwams, killed seven Narragansetts and captured eight prisoners, 
all in time to return to Wickford by nightfall.  Throughout the following days, the soldiers had 
constant interactions with Narragansett Indians.  One Narragansett, called Stone-wall John, met 
with the commanders, claiming he had been sent from the sachems.  The man boasted of 
Narragansett numbers and strength, warning the English not to begin a fight with the tribe.  
When the man left headquarters, he and his soldiers met with an English garrison, killing a 
sergeant and at least one more soldier.  The killings were a warning for English soldiers not to 
penetrate too far into Narragansett country.  On the sixteenth, Hubbard related that an 
Englishman’s house in Pettaquamscutt had also been burned and destroyed, killing ten English 
men and five women and children.
66
  Though these attacks were warnings to the English to leave 
Narragansett country, the attacks most likely stirred up feelings of revenge on the side of the 
English and desires to punish the Narragansetts for their deceitfulness. 
On the seventeenth of December, reinforcements finally arrived from Connecticut, 
containing three hundred Englishmen and one hundred and fifty Mohegans.  With the entire 
force finally assembled, it was decided that the entirety of the Massachusetts and Plymouth 
forces would march to Pettaquamscutt and upon first opportunity, engage the Narragansett 
enemy.  By the nineteenth, after wading through the snow and the cold for a night, the colonial 
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forces reached the edge of a swamp, where their Indian guide assured them that they would find 
the Narragansetts.  Narragansetts guarding the nearby fort immediately fired upon the troops, and 
fighting ensued.
67
  The battle would be known as the Great Swamp Fight and would be a pivotal 
turning point for Narragansetts in King Philip’s War.68 
On the twenty-eighth of December, a letter was written by a member of the colonial 
forces and sent to London entitled A Farther Brief and True Narration of the Great Swamp 
Fight.  The letter recounted the course of the important battle, describing the events of the 
nineteenth as follows:  
On the 19
th
, although it was Sunday, our Men thought they could 
not serve God Better then to require Justice of the Indians for the 
Innocent Blood which had been so oft by those Truceent Savages 
shed ; and we were cheerfully ready… to forgo our own lives to be 
revenged of these Philistines, that had made Sport with our 
miseries; we marched through the Snow and came to a thick 
Swamp… wherein were encamped 3500 Indians.  We first 
demanded to have Philip and his Adherents to be delivered 
Prisoners to us, according to Articles : And had no other Answer 
but shot ; then we fired about 500 Wigwams… and killed all that 
we met with of them, as well Squaws and Papposes, (i.e. Women 
and Children) as Sanups (i.e Men.)… It did greatly rejoice our 
Men to see their Enemies, who had formerly skulked behind 
Shrubs and Trees, now to be engaged in a fair Field, where they 
had no defence but in their Arms or rather their Heels… We have 
slain of the Enemy about 500 Fighting Men, besides some that 
were burnt in their Wigwams, and Women and Children the 
number of which we took no account of ; also one of their 
Sachems is slain.
69
 
 
The narrative shows a brutality towards the Narragansetts, which would finally allow for the 
Narragansetts to openly join the Wampanoags in fights against the English.  The colonial forces 
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did not discriminate against their targets, killing Narragansett women and children, lighting 
Narragansett homes on fire, unaware and unsympathetic of who was inside.  When the 
Narragansetts began to flee, the English mocked them, recounting that they enjoyed fighting the 
Narragansetts in a “fair field,” where their only strength was their ability to fight or, in this case, 
put their “heels” in flight.  The English boasted about the number of Narragansetts they killed, 
citing how so many had perished that they took no account of the women and children or those 
that had been burnt alive in their homes.  Throughout all this, the letter thanked God for being on 
their side and allowing them to massacre these Narragansetts. 
 Colonel Benjamin Church corroborates the story of the Great Swamp Fight in his 
narrative of King Philip’s War, though his tone is somewhat more somber.  What may be most 
shocking is that Church reports that the burning of wigwams was not a spur of the moment 
decision.  Church wrote, “the English people in the fort had begun to set fire to the wigwams and 
houses in the fort… They told him [Church] they had orders from the General to burn them.”70  
That these actions were premeditated makes them all the more malicious and terrible, showing a 
callous disregard for Native American life on the part of the English.  At this point, the 
relationship between the Narragansetts and the English had entirely broken down.  The pressure 
put on the Narragansetts to join in alliance with the English finally reached a boiling point.  The 
Narragansetts refused to submit to the English, which would have been humiliating.  Instead they 
would fight, the only choice they felt left to them after the massacre at the Great Swamp Fight.
71
 
Unable to accept that the Narragansetts would not come under their rule, the English 
undoubtedly felt that their only choice was to strike against the Narragansetts.  Both sides would 
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have felt they were left with no other options, illustrating a complete breakdown in the colonial 
relationship between the Narragansetts and the colonists. 
 Church recounted the large death toll, stating, “Some of the enemy that were then in the 
fort have since informed us that nearly a third of the Indians belonging to all that Narragansett 
country were killed by the English and by the cold that night; that they fled out of their fort so 
hastily that they carried nothing with them; that if the English had kept in the fort, the Indians 
had certainly been necessitated either to surrender themselves to them or to have perished by 
hunger and the severity of the season.”72  This evidence supported the idea that the English were 
no longer trying to gain Narragansett obedience.  The fact that almost one-third of the entire 
Narragansett population, according to Church, was wiped out in one battle exemplified the 
brutality with which the English assaulted the fort.  Furthermore, the English were well aware of 
the cold conditions, as they had experienced them in their march to get to the swamp.  They 
knew that the Narragansetts would have nowhere to go after their wigwams were burnt and 
would be subjected to the brutality of a New England winter night.  The decision to destroy 
wigwams was another way of ensuring that more Narragansetts would perish after the battle and 
that the tribe would be further weakened.  If the Narragansetts would not ally themselves with 
the English, then they would be destroyed. 
In the wake of the tremendous violence of the Great Swamp Fight, the Narragansett tribe 
still remained divided in its decision to ally with Philip, demonstrating the conflict of young 
versus old that still existed within tribe.  On the eighth of January, Ninigret sent a messenger to 
the English maintaining his loyalty to them.  He informed the English that two younger 
Narragansett sachems, Canonchet and Panoquin, were leading the war effort and would continue 
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to fight rather than succumb to the English. Narragansett sachem, Canonicus, also sent word to 
the English that he desired more time to create a new treaty of peace with them.  The English, 
however, felt they had enough of treaties with the Narragansetts and resolved to attack instead of 
sue for peace.
73
  Despite this divide among the Narragansett sachems, the massacre at the Great 
Swamp Fight would be the turning point for the Narragansetts, as the overwhelming majority of 
the tribe openly joined Philip in his efforts against the English directly after the battle.  Benjamin 
Church described this new alliance: “Philip… meets with all the remnants of the Narragansett 
and Nipmuck Indians, that were there gathered together [at Wetuset Hills]… and made their 
descent on Sudbury… where they met with and swallowed up valiant Captain Wadsworth and 
his company, and [wrought] many other doleful desolation in those parts.”74  The Narragansetts 
had now officially allied themselves with Philip and consummated this alliance by besieging 
numerous English towns with ferocity. 
 In late January, colonial forces were pursuing their Indian enemies, including the 
Narragansetts, as they wreaked havoc among English towns and residences.  The English 
eventually caught up with, killed, and captured around seventy Indians but were unable to 
continue their pursuit due to a need for provisions.  The Indian force had, however, been chased 
toward Connecticut and, for the Narragansetts, out of their own country.
75
  Owing to the winter 
season, the  Narragansetts were  now far from  any food or supplies they desperately needed  and 
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would take any opportunity to gain necessary provisions, which meant laying siege to the first 
English town they came across.
76
  Joining with Philip meant that attacking English villages was 
now part of the war tactics of the Narragansetts, and on February 10, 1676, the Narragansetts, in 
combination with the Nipmucs and the Wampanoags, raided Lancaster, Massachusetts. 
 In their raid of Lancaster, the Indians took a number of prisoners, including Mary 
Rowlandson, who would survive to be later ransomed off to the English and eventually write a 
narrative of her time in captivity with the three Algonquian tribes.  Rowlandson described the 
brutality of the attack on the town as it began: “hearing the noise of some Guns, we looked out; 
several Houses were burning… There were five persons taken in one house, the Father, and the 
Mother and a sucking Child, they knockt on the head; the other two they took and carried away 
alive… Another there was who running along was shot and wounded and fell down; he begged 
of them his life, promising them Money (as they told me) but they would not harken to him but 
knockt him in head, and strip him naked, and split open his Bowels.”77  Rowlandson and her 
neighbors expressed shock at the aggression and cruelty of the Algonquian tribes, but the same 
cruelty had been used on the families of the Narragansetts who had been burned alive in their 
homes or forced into the cold winter night to starve to death.
78
  The brutality displayed by the 
Narragansetts in Lancaster, and in many other New England towns, exemplified the tragic 
breakdown of any relationship between the English and the Narragansetts.  The colonial 
relationship, at this point, had been almost totally destroyed as both sides now wished to 
exterminate the other. 
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 The Narragansetts continued their attacks on the English in the months after the Great 
Swamp Fight.  On the twenty-first of February, an Algonquian force took Medfield, burning and 
pillaging the town.
79
  A month later, an Indian force surprised and assaulted a Plymouth 
company under the command of Captain Michael Pierce, which had been sent out to stem the 
tide of Indian attacks that were currently occurring in Massachusetts, and killed over forty 
Englishmen.  Only two days later, on the twenty-eighth of March, the town of Rehoboth fell to 
yet another Indian attack.
80
  After a formal recognition of Narragansett support, it seemed that 
Philip and his forces had strengthened, launching attack after attack on English towns and 
leaving devastation in their wake.  The actions of the English at the Great Swamp Fight had lit a 
fire inside the Narragansett tribe, pushing the tribe into a much stronger alliance with Philip.  The 
strong English desire for a Narragansett alliance early in the war had caused the English to 
become wholly suspicious of the tribe when they did not completely subscribe to the stipulations 
of the treaty made back in July of 1675.  The English reaction to the disobedience would become 
the catalyst that allowed the Narragansetts to openly fight alongside Philip and his forces for the 
remainder of the war and savagely attack the towns they came across. 
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III. THE AFTERMATH OF KING PHILIP’S WAR 
 As the spring of 1676 wore on, the success of the Narragansetts and Philip’s allies started 
to wane as the English changed their battle tactics.  The English became better at coordination 
efforts between colonies and relied more on Christian Indians, whom greatly helped the English 
scouting effort.  They also began targeting Indian food supplies and employing smaller hit-and-
run tactics, rather than trying to engage Indians in an open field battle.  To further compound 
these problems for the Algonquians, the threat of disease was growing, killing more Indian 
warriors than battle did.  Additionally, the Narragansett sachem, Canonchet, was captured by 
Connecticut and Mohegan forces and executed in early May.  Canonchet was a major war leader, 
not only for the Narragansetts, but also for the Wampanoags and Nipmucs who the Narragansetts 
had joined in rebellion against the English.  Internal conflict also threatened to tear the 
Algonquian allies apart as some older Nipmuc sachems were becoming reluctant to pursue war 
any longer while the younger Metacom and Quinnapin, a Narragansett sachem, refused to enter 
into any form of negotiations with the English.
81
   
During her captivity, Mary Rowlandson described how the spirit of the Indians was 
beginning to break due to these divisions. Even after they had just won a victory at the 
Massachusetts town of Sudbury,  “they said they had killed two Captains, and almost an hundred 
men… yet they came home without that rejoycing and triumphant over their victory, which they 
were wont to shew at other times, but rather like Dogs (as they say) which have lost their ears.  
Yet I could not perceive that it was for their own loss of men: They said, they had not lost above  
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five or six… When they went, they acted as if the Devil had told them that they should gain the 
victory: and now they acted, as if the Devil had told them they should have a fall… so it proved, 
for quickly they began to fall, and so held on that Summer, till they came to utter ruine.”82  Even 
with a victory, the Algonquians were not able to stir up any morale.  The Indians had become 
exhausted in their battles against the English, and with the combination of disease, starvation, 
and divisions, these internal conflicts had started to eat away at the resolve of the Indian alliance.  
As Rowlandson observed, it was clear that their end was near. 
 By the beginning of July, Major John Talcott form Connecticut attacked a large 
Narragansett village, killing thirty-four men and one hundred and thirty-seven women and 
children.
83
  The event is described in 1676 by Nathaniel Saltonstall in his narrative of King 
Philip’s War: “Major Talkot slew and took Captive Four and Twenty of the Enemies in one 
Weeks Time, and also killed the Old Queen of Narraganset, and an arch Villain of their Party… 
famously known by the Name of Stonewall, or Stone-Layer John… [Stonewall] was of great Use 
to the Indians in building their Forts, etc.”84  The Old Queen of Narragansett was Ninigret’s 
sister, Quaiapen, while Stonewall was the Indian who had taunted English forces at Wickford 
days before the Great Swamp Fight.  Both deaths were a major blow to the Narragansetts 
combined with the hundreds of other Narragansetts that had been massacred.  Over sixty more 
Narragansetts were slaughtered by Talcott the next day, leaving the Narragansetts totally 
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decimated and with no choice but to sign a peace treaty with Massachusetts Bay on the fifteenth 
of July.
85
 
 On August twelfth, Metacom was captured and killed by a force under the command of 
Benjamin Church, finally ending the rebellion that had begun over one year ago.
86
 The 
Narragansett sachems had all been killed by the English after Quinnipian, the only remaining 
sachem, was executed by the English shortly after Metacom’s death.  The Narragansett tribe was 
left in ruins, finding sanctuary with Ninigret, sachem of the closely related Niantic tribe who had 
remained close with the Narragansetts throughout the war.
87
  The English had almost totally 
eradicated the Algonquian Indians of southern New England in King Philip’s War, including 
what had been one of the most powerful tribes in the area, the Narragansetts.  Shortly after the 
end of the war, the English began selling off Narragansetts lands.  
 On August 23, 1676, the Council of War in Connecticut claimed tracts of Narragansett 
country, declaring: “Forasmuch as all those lands in the Narrogancett country doe lye and are 
circumscribed w
th
in the known limitts of o
r
 Charter, viz. from Narrogancett Bay on the east &c. 
as is therein graciously expressed by his Ma
tie
 to be granted the Colony of Connecticutt, which 
have been and now are recouered out of the hands of the Indian enemies that had victorized over 
or caused the people totally to desert all those lands which they had possessed themselues of, 
formerly.”88  The Connecticut Council made it clear that they had no intentions of returning the 
lands the Narragansetts vacated during the war back to the tribe, claiming that the Narragansetts 
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had pushed the English off the land, not taking into account the fact that the Narragansetts had 
held the land long before the colonists arrived in the area.  Connecticut, along with the colonies 
of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, took advantage of the weakened state of the Narragansetts to 
finally claim the land that they had so long desired but were unable to attain while the 
Narragansetts still held some semblance of strength. 
 In October, the General Assembly of Rhode Island began dividing up the Narragansett 
lands by acreage, doling out parcels to preselected recipients.  The Assembly stated that ten 
thousand acres would be divided among one hundred men and five thousand acres would be set 
aside for a township, while five hundred acres near the shore would be divided into house lots.  
Military commanders were also appointed to survey the entirety of Narragansett country to 
decide how best to continue their division of the area.
89
  The English colonists had finally 
acquired what they had craved before King Philip’s War had begun:  land of the Algonquian 
tribes.  Metacom had rebelled because he saw that the English were ceaselessly encroaching on 
his lands and realized if this was not stopped he and the other tribes of the region would lose 
everything.  Unfortunately, the resulting war sped up the process of English land grabbing after 
Philip and his Narragansett allies were defeated and virtually stamped out of their homelands. 
 Though many of the rebellious Algonquian tribes had been killed during the war, there 
were some survivors, but English treatment of Indian captives would be no more benevolent than 
the treatment of their lands.  Connecticut’s Council of War described the treatment of one such 
captive in a statement to Lieutenant Thomas Holister:  
Menowniet, one of o
r
 Indian enemies taken neer 
Farmington...giues an acco
t
 of a parcell of armes that were by the 
enemie hid neer Pacomptock... Councill have seen cause to 
nominate and appoynt L
nt
 Tho: Holister to take under his conduct 
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about ten men with the sayd prisoner, and to march forthw
th
 to the 
sayd place where the armes are s
d
 to be hid ; and if yet they 
remayn, he is hereby ordered to seiz the s
d
 armes and conuay them 
in safe custody to Hartford ; and in case the s
d
 Indian Menowniett 
doe not carry it well or doe not made discouery, then s
d
 L
nt
 Holister 
is left at liberty to kill the s
d
 Menowniett or to return him to prison 
agayn... and is hereby fully commissionated to kill and destroy all 
such of the enemie as shall come within his power.
90
 
 
Connecticut essentially gave its military commanders power to kill, with no discretion, any 
enemy Algonquian prisoner who was put in his charge.  There did not have to be any formal 
hearing to execute the prisoners or any permission granted to the officer in charge, exemplifying 
the conquering attitude of the English.  The English had already decimated the Narragansetts, 
Wampanoags, and Nipmucs in the war, but the indiscriminate killing continued even after it was 
clear that the Indians would no longer be able to continue their fight to make sure the colonial 
conquest would be complete. 
 Perhaps more shocking is how the English treated their strongest Indian allies, the 
Mohegans, in the aftermath of the war.  When the war was still in full swing, Uncas had been put 
in charge of taking surrenders.  He would secure those Indians that had surrendered to an English 
commander so they would later be ready to stand trial in the General Court or Council of 
Connecticut.
91
  It would be logical to assume that Uncas would be rewarded for holding and 
securing these captives of war, possibly being allowed to integrate them into his tribe, as was 
Indian practice at the time.  That, however, would not be the case.  In August, the Connecticut 
Council declared that Uncas would no longer be allowed to hold the hostages, stating: “Many or  
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most of the remayneing captiues and the other Indians that have surrendered themselues to the 
English vpon this war, being w
th 
Uncas, he was sent for, and (being discoursed w
th
all,) he was 
tould that the warr was the Englishe’s, and the successe belongs to them; the Councill were 
therefor now mett to dispose of all the persons abouesayd, as may be best for the good of the 
country.”92  It may not be shocking that the English treated their enemies with little regard, but 
that they also treated their greatest ally with the same disrespect illustrates the deep-seated 
prejudices that were engrained in the colonial mind.  The English could not reward the 
Mohegans for their service because the goal of the colonists was to gain submission from all 
Indians.  Rewarding the Mohegans for their service would be placing the tribe on the same level 
of English subjects, a position which the English did not feel any Indian deserved. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Narragansetts’ history of interactions with the English unfolded in such a way that 
caused the tribe to question English motives.  Beginning with their alliance during the Pequot 
War, the Narragansetts witnessed the brutality of the English when they indiscriminately killed 
Pequot men, women, and children at what would later be dubbed the Mystic Massacre.  
Additionally, the Narragansetts were cheated out of the spoils of war despite their full support of 
the English throughout.  Their closeness with the English in the Pequot War would offer the 
Narragansetts ample evidence to begin mistrusting colonial promises. 
As time went on, English support for the Narragansetts’ ardent rival, the Mohegans, 
would cause them to question any English alliance during King Philip’s War that would include 
working with the detestable Mohegan sachem, Uncas.  Despite Narragansett misgivings, the 
English refused to back off, constantly sending delegates to the tribe and forcing a peace treaty 
on them in the early months of King Philip’s War.  When the Narragansetts refused to follow the 
stipulations of a treaty that would lessen their power, the English punished them for their 
disloyalty with the slaughter of the Great Swamp Fight, finally pushing the Narragansetts into an 
open alliance with Philip. 
In joining Philip, the Narragansetts also used extremely violent tactics in their raids on 
colonial towns throughout Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  The tactics, however, should not be 
the focus.  The desperation that the Narragansetts and other Algonquian tribes were brought to 
resulted from English actions and desire for supreme control.  Violence became the only means 
of protest that Indians could use against the colonists.  The English had been threatening the 
Algonquian way of life decades before King Philip’s War broke out through attempts at unfair 
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territorial acquisitions.  The Algonquians, including the Narragansetts, were faced with either 
watching their homelands slip away from them or fighting against the English with violence.  
Both the English and the Indians of southern New England resorted to brutal tactics to try to 
achieve their goals with many deaths on both sides.  The potential for alliance and any 
relationship between the English and the Narragansetts had been completely destroyed.  The 
colonial relationship had deteriorated and would continue to throughout the following centuries.  
The relationship did not change as more Europeans immigrated to America and Indians 
throughout the entire country were displaced.  The history of the Narragansetts offers insight into 
how the misfortune of Indians throughout American began in the colonies of New England more 
than three centuries ago when there was a complete breakdown in relations between Native 
Americans and English colonists – a rift which would never be repaired. 
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APPENDICES 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
A map of southern New England in 1675, showing the territories of the Native 
American tribes of the region. From “Native Indian Tribes in New England in the 
early 17
th
 century,” “Dr. Benjamin Church,” http://drbenjaminchurchjr.blogspot 
.com/2011/10/natives-of-new-england-1675.html (accessed December 9, 2011). 
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Appendix II 
A depiction of the Mystic Massacre, occurring on May 26, 1637, where Pequot 
Indians were brutally killed by English soldiers during the Pequot War.  The inner 
circle represents Indian houses while the two outer circles depict soldiers from 
Connecticut.  The last circle depicts Indian allies of the English, presumably the 
Narragansetts or Mohegans. From Daniel Mandell, King Philip’s War: The Conflict 
Over New England (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), 40.  
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Appendix III 
One of the only known depictions of the Niantic sachem, Ninigret, an important 
sachem in the context of King Philip’s War.  From Daniel Mandell, King Philip’s 
War: The Conflict Over New England (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), 40.  
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Appendix IV 
A depiction of the Great Swamp Fight on December 19, 1675, when forces of the 
United Colonies attacked a Narragansett fort, killing hundreds. From Daniel Mandell, 
King Philip’s War: The Conflict Over New England (New York: Infobase Publishing, 
2007), 83.    
Appendix V 
An image from Mary Rowlandson’s narrative of her captivity amongst Narragansett 
Indians after their raid on Lancaster, in which a woman tries to fight off Native 
Americans armed with axes and rifles during the raid. From Jill Lepore, The Name of 
War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1998), 187.  
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